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Abstract: (250 words) 12 
The unexpectedly poor performances of complex mitigation systems in recent natural disasters demonstrates the need to 13 
reexamine mitigation system functionality, especially those combining multiple mitigation strategies. A systematic 14 
classification of mitigation strategies is presented as a basis for understanding how different types of strategy within an 15 
overall mitigation system can interfere destructively, to reduce the effectiveness of the system as a whole. We divide 16 
mitigation strategies into three classes according to the timing of the actions that they prescribe. Permanent 17 
mitigation strategies prescribe actions such as construction of tsunami barriers or land use restrictions: they are 18 
frequently both costly and “brittle” in that the actions work up to a design limit of hazard intensity or magnitude and 19 
then fail. Responsive mitigation strategies prescribe actions after a hazard source event has occurred, such as 20 
evacuations, that rely on capacities to detect and quantify hazard events and to transmit warnings fast enough to enable 21 
at risk populations to decide and act effectively. Anticipatory mitigation strategies prescribe use of the interpretation 22 
of precursors to hazard source events as a basis for precautionary actions, but challenges arise from uncertainties in 23 
hazard behaviour. The NE Japan tsunami mitigation system and its performance in the 2011 Tohoku disaster provides 24 
examples of interactions between mitigation strategies. We propose that the classification presented here would enable 25 
consideration of how the addition of a new strategy to a mitigation system would affect the performance of existing 26 
strategies within that system, and furthermore aid the design of integrated mitigation systems. 27 
 28 
Key words: Mitigation Strategies, Warning Systems, Natural Hazards, Risk, Precursors, Policy.  29 
Revised manuscript
Click here to view linked References
 2 
TEXT 30 
 31 
1. Introduction: the problem of interaction between mitigation strategies  32 
 33 
Mitigation strategies are policies or procedures that lead to more or less pre-planned actions that operate before or 34 
during a hazard event to reduce its impact on vulnerable populations. Common examples include land-use and 35 
development planning; engineering strategies such as tsunami barriers, river or tidal flood defences, and seismically 36 
resilient buildings; and warning systems that foster education, evacuation plans, and communication to enable 37 
mitigation actions at the time of hazard events or in anticipation of them. Different types or classes of mitigation 38 
strategy require differing time scales and methods of implementation according to both the nature of the hazards and the 39 
vulnerabilities of the exposed societies. Critically, it is normal for multiple mitigation strategies to be developed and 40 
applied together or, more commonly, added in a progressive sequence reflecting technological and socio-economic 41 
developments rather than any systematic ab initio plan (one starting from a state of no mitigation). Although in 42 
principle one integrated system could provide for mitigation of multiple hazards (especially those that commonly occur 43 
in association such as earthquakes, landslides and tsunamis) we consider it more convenient for the analysis presented 44 
in this paper to define separate but interlinked and interacting mitigation systems each addressing a single hazard. 45 
 46 
As a first step to understanding these interactions we introduce the concept of a mitigation system, which consists of 47 
all the mitigation strategies implemented together to ensure “the lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of 48 
hazards and related disasters” (UNISDR 2007). The authors expand this UNISDR definition of mitigation as follows: 49 
 50 
The adverse impacts of hazards often cannot be prevented fully, but their scale or severity can be substantially 51 
lessened by various strategies and actions. Mitigation measures encompass engineering techniques and hazard-52 
resistant construction as well as improved environmental policies and public awareness. 53 
 54 
We use the UNISDR definition of mitigation in preference to the more restrictive definition of mitigation used in, for 55 
example, the United States (Lindell et al., 2006). Importantly, the inclusion of “public awareness” in the UNISDR 56 
definition implies that mitigation, as well as involving actions taken long before hazard event occurrence such as 57 
engineered flood defences, also includes measures that enable impact-reducing actions taken immediately before or at 58 
the time of the hazard event: an example might include a flood warning siren and education of the population around it 59 
to respond to sounding of the siren by evacuating a potential flood inundation zone. Both the physical flood defence 60 
strategy and the siren-plus-education strategy are mitigation strategies: a key point that we aim to make in this paper is 61 
that these strategies, although decided upon by policy makers well in advance of the hazard event, result in mitigative 62 
actions in different time frames relative to the hazard event. The distinction between mitigation strategies, as decided 63 
upon by policy-makers, and the mitigative actions taken by a wide range of actors in response to the prescriptions of the 64 
strategies, is an important one in this paper. 65 
 66 
These multiple mitigation strategies are expressed in associated legislation, policy, infrastructures and government 67 
processes, as well as in physical structures, that together form the mitigation system. Individual mitigation strategies 68 
may use complex technologies that are themselves commonly referred to as systems; for clarity we refer to these as 69 
technological sub-systems to distinguish them from the overall mitigation system. The general definition of a system 70 
used here is that of a group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements forming a complex whole (Kim 71 
1994). A mitigation system is thus a set of interacting, interrelated or interdependent mitigation strategies implemented 72 
for the purpose of mitigating the effects of a particular hazard or group of hazards. We emphasise that the integration of 73 
multiple mitigation strategies as a system should be analysed as a complex system by focusing on interactions between 74 
the elements of the system in operation under constraints of time and uncertainty (Mileti 1999, p107). Importantly, 75 
these interactions can take place through time in different stages of the disaster management (DM) cycle; four temporal 76 
phases or stages of disaster management commonly adopted and applied by emergency practitioners and policy makers 77 
(mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery). Such interactions across time present a problem for the standard 78 
model of the DM cycle (Lindell et al., 2006), which is commonly implemented (Coetzee & van Niekerk, 2012) with the 79 
simplifying assumption that, within one circuit of the cycle, the stages of the cycle exist in relation to each other only as 80 
a linear sequence of processes.   81 
 82 
An important consequence of this idea of disaster management as a linear series of processes that occur in sequence 83 
during each circuit of the DM cycle is that it may lead to the assumption that when adding new mitigation strategies, the 84 
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effectiveness of the system as a whole will always be a linear product of the  component mitigation strategies. However, 85 
this assumption does not allow for the possibility that actions prescribed by these strategies will interact with each other 86 
in ways that are not anticipated or allowed for by their designers and operators. Unexpected destructive interactions (or 87 
“interferences”) can damage the effectiveness of the strategies, or even render particular combinations of strategies 88 
actively dangerous. Conversely, it is possible that constructive interaction may occur between mitigation strategies so 89 
that the whole system is more effective than the sum of the parts; but in the absence of conscious design for 90 
constructive interactions, such occurrences are fortuitous.  91 
 92 
The concept of destructive and constructive interaction between mitigation strategies raises further questions that we 93 
also consider in this paper: 94 
 95 
1. How can mitigation strategies be classified?  96 
2. How do the limitations of our knowledge of hazards affect our choice of mitigation strategies and 97 
combinations of strategies?  98 
3. How do different classes of mitigation strategies interact with other classes? 99 
We are primarily concerned here with mitigation systems designed to mitigate the effects of rapid-onset geophysical 100 
hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis, windstorms and volcanic eruptions. Nevertheless, we consider that the concepts 101 
outlined may also be relevant to the mitigation of extended hazard events such as droughts. 102 
 103 
2. Classification of Mitigation Strategies 104 
 105 
2.1 Classification criteria 106 
 107 
The classification that we present here is based upon two criteria that relate to the mitigative actions that result from 108 
mitigation strategies: 109 
 110 
1) Timeframe: when do the mitigative actions resulting from the strategy occur – does it produce actions (such as 111 
construction of flood defences) long before the hazard event whose effects are then permanently operative (or at least 112 
continuously operative over a specified time period), or are these actions triggered either by the successful detection of 113 
the source event that generates a hazard (or an early manifestation of the hazard such as first landfall of a tsunami), or 114 
by successful detection and interpretation of precursors to the hazard source event that are recorded and interpreted by 115 
observers or by some form of warning technology? 116 
 117 
2) Adaptability: does the strategy enable the actions resulting from it to be modified or adapted immediately before or 118 
during an unfolding hazard event by optional decisions made following observations of the hazard or its precursors (we 119 
use the word optional here to emphasise that a potential decision maker may choose not to intervene and rely upon 120 
decisions made by others), or are these actions fixed in advance of the hazard event? The latter applies most obviously 121 
in the case of permanent physical hazard defence structures, but also in the case of automated responses as discussed 122 
below. The optional decisions involved in modifying or adapting the actions may take many forms and may be made by 123 
different people ranging from individuals within directly vulnerable populations through professional emergency 124 
managers to political leaders. 125 
 126 
An important feature of these two criteria is that they encompass the possibility that, once implemented, a mitigation 127 
strategy may require no further decision-making or actions unless and until public, political or scientific opinion seeks 128 
to change it as a result of social, economic, environmental, political changes, or changes in knowledge of the hazard, 129 
that have occurred since implementation of the strategy. This feature, which applies most obviously in the case of 130 
permanent physical defences against a hazard, presents problems for the concept of “early warning systems” as it has 131 
developed in recent years. The definition of “early warning system” has developed from the more narrowly defined 132 
‘means of getting information about an impending emergency, communicating that information to those that need it, 133 
and facilitating good decisions and timely response by people in danger’ (Mileti and Sorenson 1990) to the broadly 134 
defined ‘systems that link risk knowledge, monitoring and warning services, dissemination and communication, and 135 
response capability’ (UNISDR PPEW 2006, p2). This expansion presumed that mitigative actions necessarily involve 136 
communication and decision-making based upon information provided by monitoring and warning technologies leading 137 
to actions in response to that information, but this is not always true as illustrated in our Tohoku disaster case study 138 
(section 3). Therefore, we argue that the policy choice to introduce mitigation strategies that rely on such technologies 139 
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and associated communication and decision-support technological systems as a basis for mitigative actions should be 140 
recognized explicitly as such, and that alternatives should at least be considered. Whilst the concept of a mitigation 141 
system presented here resembles the broadest definition of an Early Warning System (EWS) as used by Garcia & 142 
Fearnley (2012), we regard the change of terminology as important: it focuses upon the aim or purpose of the system, 143 
and makes no presumptions about how this aim or purpose is to be achieved.  144 
 145 
Given the two criteria identified above, we identify three classes or categories of mitigation strategy: permanent, 146 
responsive and anticipatory.  147 
 148 
2.2. Permanent mitigation strategies 149 
 150 
Permanent mitigation strategies involve actions that are put in place long before hazard events and remain in place at all 151 
times, at least within specified periods (as for example in the case of an annual insurance policy). Their operation is not 152 
dependent upon human decisions or actions shortly before or at the time of the hazard event, and so cannot be adapted 153 
in the light of observations of impending or occurring hazard events, to mitigate those events. Although of course they 154 
may be changed after an event to take advantage of lessons learned and in the hope of mitigating future occurrences of 155 
the same hazard (for example the renewed interest in relocation of coastal communities to higher ground after the 2011 156 
Tohoku tsunami, following a pattern seen after earlier tsunamis: Shibata 2012; Suppasri et al. 2012, 2013, 2015), these 157 
changes only occur in the following circuit of the DM cycle. The simplest examples of permanent mitigation strategies 158 
involve implementation of permanently-in-place measures such as: physical defenses like tsunami and storm surge 159 
coastal defenses, and river flood defenses building regulations designed to reduce the vulnerability to seismic shaking 160 
of buildings, constructed or retrofitted in accordance with them; building regulations designed to reduce the 161 
vulnerability to seismic shaking of buildings, constructed or retrofitted in accordance with them; reductions in exposure 162 
to the hazard through development planning and land use restrictions, or discouragement of development through 163 
measures such as denial of public funding for infrastructure and services in high-hazard zones; and compensatory reliefs 164 
such as insurance. The first of these are “structural” mitigation strategies in the sense used by Godschalk et al. (1989) 165 
whilst the second and third are “non-structural” strategies: we emphasise however that in all three cases implementation 166 
of these measures takes place long before hazard events and does not involve decision-making during, or shortly before 167 
the hazard event. They are instead based on decisions made in advance, on yearly to multi-decadal timescales. 168 
 169 
More subtly, permanent mitigation strategies also include automated systems such as shutdowns of power systems and 170 
railways in response to initial seismic shaking (Fujinawa and Noda 2013). No human intervention is either required or 171 
possible in the operation of these systems during disasters. Other mitigation strategies may be dependent on automated 172 
infrastructural systems to be functional, for example the automated systems for rapid communication of data and 173 
warning messages around large-scale instrumental monitoring networks. Automated systems frequently have preset 174 
responses, varying according to measured criteria of the hazard event, that are fixed in advance and do not involve 175 
optional decision-making – potentially leading to novel actions – at the time of the hazard event. Given there is no 176 
capacity to respond to observations that do not fit those measured criteria (that is to say, new or unexpected 177 
observations) we therefore include automated response strategies in the category of permanent mitigation although they 178 
share some characteristics of the responsive or (more rarely) anticipatory mitigation strategies discussed below. A 179 
similar point applies to insurance and similar compensation schemes. Even though insurance payouts are triggered after 180 
a disaster, in the recovery phase of the DM cycle, the parameters of an insurance contract are all fixed at the time of its 181 
agreement. In our framework, insurance is therefore also a permanent mitigation strategy. 182 
 183 
These features of permanent mitigation strategies mean that their operation is constrained by the prior beliefs and 184 
scientific understanding of the nature of the expected hazards, in terms of probabilistic hazard occurrence and intensity 185 
distribution, that are used to design the strategies and their physical manifestations. There is therefore strong pressure 186 
upon the scientific advisors to the designers of permanent mitigation strategies to get their hazard estimates “just right” 187 
and furthermore to state these estimates with a precision that may be greater than is justified by their knowledge. Thus, 188 
permanent mitigation strategies are inherently bad at coping with the unexpected, especially if their designers fail to 189 
make allowance for their imperfect, uncertain knowledge of the hazard or hazards concerned. 190 
 191 
On the other hand, since the hazard mitigation measures that result from a permanent mitigation strategy, once 192 
implemented, are always in effect, no advance knowledge is required of when an individual hazard event will occur, or 193 
with what intensity; nor does it require any ability of individuals to act in response to observations of the hazard event 194 
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or precursors to it. Permanent mitigation strategies and the mitigation systems that depend on them are, therefore, very 195 
much the product of institutional rather than individual knowledge; with all that that implies regarding the capacity of 196 
these strategies and systems to respond to new knowledge of the hazard that they are designed to protect against. 197 
 198 
2.3. Responsive mitigation strategies 199 
 200 
Responsive mitigation strategies involve decisions and actions in response to the detection and interpretation of a 201 
hazard event once the source event has occurred and taking advantage of the time gap compared to the time needed to 202 
implement changes to the plans previously devised in accordance with the mitigation strategy between the source event 203 
and its impact on vulnerable populations and environments. Responsive mitigation strategies therefore have a potential 204 
for adaptation of actions on the basis of the observations of the hazard event, although the capacity for adaptation may 205 
be severely limited by the short duration of this time gap. They may be based upon complex technological sub-systems 206 
or relying on simple direct sensory (non-instrumental) observations made by groups and individuals within vulnerable 207 
populations. These strategies require capacities to: recognise the signs that a hazard-causing event has occurred, or is 208 
about to impact vulnerable exposures; to interpret those signs in terms of the intensity of the hazard and if necessary 209 
communicate that interpretation to distinct decision-makers; to optionally decide what action to take to mitigate the 210 
hazard; and to carry out those mitigative actions in a timely fashion so that they have a positive effect (we note that the 211 
confusion caused by late changes to, for example, evacuation routes and plans, may reduce rather than increase the 212 
effectiveness of a strategy for responsive mitigation by evacuation). Several aspects of knowledge of the hazard event 213 
are therefore involved in the successful implementation of a responsive mitigation strategy, which must be determined, 214 
interpreted and processed in the short time between the hazard-causing event and the impact of the hazard. These time 215 
intervals can range from seconds, in the case of earthquakes, to tens of minutes in the case of near-field tsunamis and 216 
tornadoes, to many hours in the case of far-field tsunamis and hurricanes. Furthermore, this rapid process needs to be 217 
reliable, avoiding both underestimation of the hazard event on the one hand (leading to insufficient mitigative actions in 218 
this particular event) and overestimation on the other, that may lead to a “false alarm” or “cry wolf” syndrome that is 219 
liable to hinder responsive mitigation of future similar events.  220 
 221 
Provided the knowledge base that underpins observation and interpretation of the hazard is sufficiently profound, the 222 
operators of responsive mitigation strategies can modify the actions prescribed by the strategy to cope with the 223 
unexpected, particularly unexpectedly high hazard intensities. However, short time intervals available for effective 224 
action can require complete or partial automation of key technological components of responsive mitigation strategies. 225 
An example is the automated processing of detected signals to generate warning messages that are then evaluated by a 226 
scientist to reduce false alarms, before being transmitted further. The difference between such a case and the completely 227 
automated shut-down systems that we have argued to be permanent mitigation strategies (section 2.2) may be slight or 228 
significant, according to the range of interpretative judgments and optional actions available to, respectively, the 229 
scientists (or other observers) and emergency managers under the protocols and cultures that govern their work. There 230 
is, therefore, a gradation between responsive mitigation strategies and permanent mitigation strategies reflecting a 231 
tradeoff between adaptability and timeliness. We emphasize that the key distinction between the two is that actions 232 
prescribed by a responsive mitigation strategy can be adapted in near real-time during a hazard event, on the basis of 233 
decisions made in response to new observations and interpretations of the hazard, whereas the actions involved in 234 
implementation of a permanent mitigation strategy cannot. 235 
 236 
2.4. Anticipatory mitigation strategies 237 
 238 
Anticipatory mitigation strategies involve actions that are implemented on the basis of observations and interpretations 239 
of precursory phenomena to hazard-causing events, in the time period in which those precursors occur (which may vary 240 
from hours to days, in the case of many meteorological hazards, to months or even years in the case of volcanic 241 
eruption hazards). These actions may be adapted to allow for new information about the nature, intensity and extent of 242 
the anticipated hazard event that is gained as a result of interpretation of the hazard precursors. Anticipatory mitigation 243 
strategies therefore depend fundamentally upon the knowledge base used to reliably identify precursory phenomena to 244 
the hazard-causing event, and to interpret those phenomena in ways that provide indicators of the location, time and 245 
magnitude of the hazard-causing event with sufficient certainty to enable prediction of the timing and intensity 246 
distribution of the resulting hazard in a form that provides a basis for mitigative actions. In the case of complex hazard 247 
events, such as volcanic eruptions, there may also be uncertainty about the nature of the hazards that are about to occur, 248 
and the occurrence and intensity distributions of secondary hazards such as landslides, dam break floods and fires. 249 
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 250 
Anticipatory mitigation therefore depends, more than the other types of mitigation strategy, upon an understanding 251 
(normally, at least in the modern era, but not necessarily a scientific or deductive understanding; traditional beliefs may 252 
also form a basis for anticipatory actions) of the processes and mechanisms that underlie the hazard-causing event and 253 
precursory phenomena. It also depends on the level of tolerance of uncertainty by decision makers and others 254 
stakeholders, who must be prepared to accept the social, economic and reputational costs of false alarms. In general, the 255 
interpretation of precursors becomes more certain as they accumulate with time, whilst the time available for 256 
anticipatory action decreases in proportion. Whilst some societies and individuals live in a mental state of “constructive 257 
paranoia” (Diamond 2012, pp243-275) that enables anticipatory actions to mitigate a wide variety of hazards in 258 
response to the slightest warning signs, in developed societies the limits of anticipatory mitigation are constrained by 259 
the institutional state of scientific knowledge of precursory phenomena for particular hazards, as well as by the level of 260 
awareness of those particular hazards amongst vulnerable populations (Esteban et al., 2013). Therefore, anticipatory 261 
warnings are normally communicated to vulnerable populations in a “top-down” fashion opening the potential for 262 
failures of communication, or for refusals to act as expected on the basis of the information communicated.  263 
 264 
The advantage of anticipatory mitigation strategies, as compared to responsive mitigation strategies, is that in general 265 
they provide longer time intervals for interpretation, warning communication, decisions and consequent mitigative 266 
actions, and therefore also greater scope to adapt the actions prescribed by the strategy to the unfolding hazard event 267 
within the limits of available resources. These resources may well have been determined long in advance and in these 268 
cases there is an overlap between anticipatory and permanent mitigation similar to that between responsive and 269 
permanent strategies discussed above. The key feature and potential critical weakness of anticipatory mitigation 270 
strategies is, however, that these decisions and actions have to be made under conditions of greater uncertainty than is 271 
the case with responsive mitigation strategies.  272 
 273 
Whilst the boundary between responsive mitigation and anticipatory mitigation is clear for those hazards that have a 274 
clear onset time (most notably earthquakes and tsunamis), the distinction is less clear for those in which the hazard is 275 
caused by an evolving event such as a hurricane. Hurricane warnings and consequent mitigation activities, such as 276 
coastal evacuations, begin with many features of anticipatory mitigation – coping with uncertainties in the track and 277 
strength of the hurricane - and only gradually evolve into responsive mitigation as the hurricane approaches landfall. 278 
 279 
2.5 Knowledge of natural hazards and the choice of mitigation strategies within a mitigation system. 280 
 281 
Decisions relating to a proposed mitigation strategy and its place within a mitigation system depend on a wide range of 282 
factors from technological and economic through to social and political factors. The complexities of these interactions 283 
between the mitigation strategies, vulnerabilities and exposures, and how decisions are made within these interactions 284 
are beyond the scope of this paper. However, we emphasise the importance of the scientific or other knowledge of 285 
hazard that underpins the design and operation of a mitigation strategy. As discussed in the previous sections dealing 286 
with each type of mitigation strategy, the aspects of knowledge of the hazard that are most critical differ systematically 287 
between the three types of mitigation strategy that we have defined. Whilst in all cases there must be some consensus 288 
regarding the threat represented by recurrence of a hazard, the different types of mitigation strategy have different 289 
knowledge base requirements. The classification presented applies to mitigation strategies for different hazards and may 290 
operate on different scales, so the details of the knowledge base differ widely. Nevertheless, we argue that some 291 
common features of the knowledge base apply to all the mitigation strategies in a particular class, that are characteristic 292 
of that class and differ between classes (Table 1).  293 
 294 
In consequence, the scientists who provide important aspects of that knowledge base play different roles, and need to 295 
provide different types of knowledge (data and interpretation) at different times, in support of the different classes of 296 
mitigation strategy. Table 1 summarises the different types of mitigation strategies and contrasts the knowledge tasks 297 
(normally science tasks) that underpin them. It is especially important to recognise that within this classification 298 
framework, different mitigation strategies are either effective or ineffective in part as a function of the present state of 299 
knowledge of the hazards concerned. 300 
 301 
 302 
 303 
 304 
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 305 
 306 
 307 
 308 
 309 
 310 
 Mitigation strategy classes and their defining characteristics 
Permanent  Responsive  Anticipatory 
Timing of implementation actions 
prescribed by strategy 
Long before hazard 
event 
In response to 
detection and 
characterization of 
hazard event 
In response to 
detection and 
interpretation of 
precursors to hazard 
event 
Adaptability of implementation actions to 
characterization of individual hazard events 
None Some (limited mainly 
by time available) 
Some (limited mainly 
by uncertainty) 
Key 
science 
tasks 
Long term spatial frequency / 
magnitude distribution 
X X x 
Understanding mechanisms 
and interpretation of 
precursors 
  X 
Rapid detection, event 
quantification and 
communication 
 X x 
Accurate alert information and 
avoidance of false alarms 
 X X 
 311 
 312 
Table 1: Classification of mitigation strategies by the criteria used in this paper and the relative importance of 313 
different aspects of knowledge of hazard as a basis for different classes of mitigation strategy, as indicated by 314 
sizes of crosses in table. 315 
 316 
Finally, it should be noted that whenever a mitigation strategy is dependent upon hazard knowledge, its effectiveness in 317 
the long term depends on the willingness to invest in the collection of that knowledge, for example in the updating of 318 
probabilistic hazard assessments, or in the monitoring and detection equipment networks that form critical elements of 319 
hazard warning systems, and in the intellectual capacity to interpret and use that knowledge as a basis for mitigative 320 
actions. In the long term, this willingness to invest in hazard knowledge will depend upon the awareness of the hazard 321 
in the populations that are vulnerable to it, as indeed will the effectiveness of mitigation strategies based upon that 322 
knowledge – especially mitigation strategies that rely upon the vulnerable populations to take decisions and act upon 323 
them, often in short time frames and in the face of uncertainty. This point has been made in relation to tsunami hazard 324 
mitigation by Esteban et al. (2013) but applies much more widely; we return to it in the discussion section below. 325 
 326 
 327 
2.6 The concepts of “brittle” and “flexible” mitigation strategies and the importance of the scientific basis for 328 
choosing mitigation strategies.  329 
 330 
An additional concept, distinct from our classification, that we find useful in analyzing the interactions of mitigation 331 
strategies is that of brittle mitigation. This, by analogy with brittle materials, means a mitigation strategy that reduces 332 
losses associated with hazard events up to a limit of hazard intensity; but that fails, in ways that are associated with high 333 
levels of loss, in events where that hazard intensity is exceeded or where the area affected by the hazard is larger than 334 
that anticipated by the mitigation strategy. Such failure can be literal and physical, as in the case of the collapse of a 335 
flood defence under pressure of water, or the inundation of a built-up area above the expected maximum flood level 336 
used to define a zone of land use restriction around a river flood plain. However, it can also be a system or process 337 
failure, for example the breakdown of a communications system upon which a responsive mitigation strategy depends, 338 
under the impact of the hazard event that it is designed to mitigate. Some strategies may have the potential to fail in 339 
 8 
both ways: for example, provision of community shelters to which people can retreat during or after a hazard event 340 
should their houses be damaged may be a brittle mitigation strategy either because the shelters themselves may be 341 
unexpectedly vulnerable either to the primary hazard or to secondary hazards, leading to both direct casualties and to 342 
the loss of emergency supplies stored in the shelters; or because provision of the shelters discourages investment by 343 
families or individuals in more hazard-resistant homes and in emergency supplies: the combination of these effects 344 
could produce a particularly brittle mitigation strategy. Again by analogy with brittle materials, which are often more 345 
rigid or have greater strength up to their failure than do similar more ductile materials, brittle mitigation strategies may 346 
actually be more effective below their limiting hazard intensity than more flexible mitigation strategies, but far less 347 
effective above this limit. Further, the term does not necessarily imply failure at low hazard intensity and for this reason 348 
we prefer the term brittle to the alternative “fragile”.  349 
 350 
In contrast to brittle mitigation strategies, a flexible mitigation strategy is one that retains a significant degree of 351 
effectiveness even when faced with a hazard intensity greater than that assumed in its design, either through inherent 352 
features of its design (as in “fail-safe” technologies that can form the basis of flexible permanent mitigation strategies) 353 
or through the design into the strategy of a capacity for adaptation of actions in response to the observation that the 354 
design hazard intensity has been, or is about to be, exceeded. Thus, a feature of a well designed responsive or 355 
anticipatory mitigation strategy, is that it is operated by individuals, groups or organizations with a level of education 356 
and technology adequate to observe and interpret observations that indicate that the impending hazard event will be of 357 
unusually high intensity. In such a case the strategy is likely to have a high degree of flexibility and so will be less 358 
dependent on any probabilistic assumptions made about the likely intensity of the hazard. It should be noted that use of 359 
advanced technology or highly educated professional operatives is not a pre-requisite for flexibility. The basis of 360 
observation and interpretation may be very simple – for example observation of large approaching tsunami waves, or of 361 
an unusually extended period of strong felt seismic shaking, may be adequate for correspondingly urgent responsive 362 
mitigation (running faster and further) by hazard-aware populations in or close to tsunami source zones. 363 
 364 
We emphasise that our distinction between “brittle” and “flexible” mitigation strategies is not the same as that between 365 
“hard” (engineered structures) and “soft” (mainly, warning and evacuation-based) protection measures that has been 366 
emphasised in the context of tsunami hazard mitigation in Japan both before and, with greater intensity, after the 367 
Tohoku 2011 earthquake and tsunami (Shibayama et al., 2013). In the case study below, we illustrate how particular 368 
types of mitigation strategy can tend to be brittle or flexible, as well as how the failure of brittle mitigation strategies 369 
can have exceptionally severe consequences when the failure is unexpected. This is typically because the assumption of 370 
effectiveness of the failed mitigation strategy may have reduced the effectiveness of other mitigation strategies within 371 
the overall mitigation system or even led to the exclusion of those alternative strategies from the design of the 372 
mitigation system. In such situations the presence of a brittle mitigation strategy within the mitigation system can be 373 
said to have embrittled the system as a whole, or other particular strategies within it where it has particular effects upon 374 
these. Thus the adoption of a brittle mitigation strategy, and its detailed design, are more likely to have dangerous 375 
consequences when it is not based upon a good understanding of those features of the hazard that affect its performance 376 
and in particular its limits of effectiveness. We emphasise, however, that anticipatory and responsive mitigation 377 
strategies are not necessarily flexible (for example, if vulnerable populations are simply told to perform predetermined 378 
actions without explanations, they are not given the capacity to vary their actions in response to their observations of the 379 
hazard event); and that permanent mitigation strategies are not necessarily brittle if the failure of structures or processes 380 
implementing those strategies is “fail-safe” or gradual. 381 
 382 
3. Retrospective analysis of interactions between mitigation strategies in the March 11th, 2011 Tohoku 383 
earthquake and tsunami  384 
 385 
In this section we use the concepts developed in the previous section to retrospectively analyse, in the spirit of analysis 386 
and retrospection promoted by Voight (1990), the causes of malfunctions in the operation of exceptionally complex 387 
seismic and tsunami hazard mitigation systems in the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami disaster. In our analysis we 388 
mainly deal with interactions between mitigation strategies that belong to different types, but also include interactions 389 
between mitigation strategies of the same type. The interactions discussed are negative interactions, but we note that 390 
positive interactions, where efforts to pursue one mitigation strategy have positive effects on the implementation or 391 
operation of another, can also occur. An example may be found in the Mt Pinatubo 1991 volcano eruption disaster, 392 
where efforts to ensure continuity of instrumental monitoring of the volcano during the impending eruption to enable 393 
evacuation in response to increasing levels of activity even during the eruption (a near – responsive mode anticipatory 394 
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mitigation strategy) may have contributed to the change in perceptions on the part of emergency managers at Clark Air 395 
Base that led them to order a preemptive (i.e. anticipatory) evacuation of the base prior to the start of the eruption 396 
proper (Punongbayan et al. 1996, p81; Anderegg 2000, p30). 397 
 398 
Whilst this section is not comprehensive (with our three classes of mitigation strategy, we would need a minimum of 24 399 
examples to cover both positive and negative interactions (in either direction) between the 6 combinations of pairs of 400 
mitigation strategy types), we aim to present an illustrative example of how the concepts developed in this paper might 401 
be used to improve the effectiveness of mitigation systems as a whole. The designers of this example mitigation system 402 
placed emphasis upon the implementation of permanent physical defences and automated systems, so our comments 403 
focus upon these and the interactions between them and other mitigation strategies, but in other cases the emphasis 404 
might for example be upon the interaction between land use planning and awareness education mitigation strategies. 405 
 406 
The 2011 Tohoku earthquake and the resulting tsunami impacted densely populated and highly developed regions in 407 
Japan, where more financial, technical and scientific resources have been put into a greater variety of hazard mitigation 408 
strategies than in any other country. Two mitigation systems were involved: one that mitigated seismic shaking hazards 409 
and the other that mitigated tsunami hazards. These were partly connected and were dependent on the same hazard 410 
assessment, but had distinct areas of coverage and involved distinct strategies (that nevertheless sometimes interacted 411 
with each other). The earthquake mitigation system – dominated by the permanent strategy of high construction 412 
standards to give buildings good resistance to seismic shaking – was generally successful as shaking intensities from the 413 
very large but offshore Tohoku earthquake were within the limits expected from smaller but closer earthquakes in the 414 
upper crust of Japan (Ye et al., 2013). However, the tsunami mitigation system is widely seen as having been at best a 415 
partial success (Suppasri et al. 2013) and by some as a major failure (Noggerath et al. 2011; Stein and Okal 2011). This 416 
is in large part because of two aspects of the disaster:  417 
 418 
1) The high mortality rate in the tsunami inundation zone was higher than expected especially in view of the large 419 
investment in mitigation measures. The mortality rate was 3% of the population in the inundation zone as a whole, and 420 
locally over 10% (Suppasri et al. 2012, 2013). These were around one-fifth to one-tenth of the corresponding mortality 421 
rates in entirely unprepared but otherwise comparable inundated coastal regions of Sumatra in the 2004 Indian Ocean 422 
tsunami (Suppasri et al. 2012: note that the latter mortality data includes people killed, or trapped in and subsequently 423 
drowned, in buildings that collapsed in the earthquake; but these do not account for the large difference in mortality 424 
rates) but, surprisingly, orders of magnitude more than is seen in major tsunamis affecting traditional coastal 425 
communities in undeveloped coastal regions of South Pacific countries where the only mitigation strategy is community 426 
based self-warning and voluntary evacuation based upon traditional (and, more recently, taught) knowledge of how to 427 
recognize and respond to strong felt earthquake shaking and the sighting of approaching tsunami waves (e.g. McAdoo 428 
et al. 2009).  429 
 430 
2) The reactor accidents and radiation releases at the Fukushima nuclear power plant (NPP) that followed limited 431 
earthquake damage and then major tsunami damage to the reactor buildings and, critically, emergency support and 432 
safety technology systems (Lipscy et al. 2013). In contrast, and despite experiencing significantly higher tsunami waves 433 
than at Fukushima, the Onagawa NPP on the Sanriku coast suffered only relatively minor damage that did not prevent 434 
safe shut down of the reactors, for reasons relating to the use of a local hazard assessment including local run up data 435 
from a wider range of past tsunami events as the basis for detailed design and layout of the NPP site (Sasagawa & 436 
Hirata 2012). As a result of this local hazard assessment, the Onagawa NPP was built with its safety critical components 437 
some 5 m to 10 m higher above sea level than the corresponding components at Fukushima, and so remained 438 
sufficiently functional to enable safe shut down of the reactors.  439 
 440 
A root cause of these aspects of the disaster was the discrepancy between the sizes of the earthquakes and tsunamis that 441 
were anticipated to occur on the NE Japan subduction zone, and the size of the earthquake and tsunami that actually 442 
occurred. We do not propose to enter the discussion about the reasons for this discrepancy  (Geller 2011; Stein and Okal 443 
2011; Kanamori 2012; Lay 2012; Stein and Geller 2012). For the purposes of this paper it is instead important to 444 
examine how the discrepancy between expectation and the reality experienced on March 11th 2011 affected both the 445 
performances of individual mitigation strategies and, in particular, the interactions between those strategies. 446 
 447 
In addition to the most important and largely effective permanent mitigation strategy of building to high standards of 448 
earthquake shaking resistance, the earthquake hazard mitigation system contained numerous implementations of more 449 
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or less automated equipment shut-down technologies (permanent mitigation strategies) such as the stopping of high 450 
speed trains and the powering-down of operating nuclear reactors. There are indications, discussed below, that some of 451 
these automated strategies may have interfered with the operation of other mitigation strategies aimed at reducing the 452 
effects of the tsunami. A more truly responsive mitigation strategy, that of training individuals to “duck and cover” or 453 
take similar immediate action in response to alarms or felt seismic shaking, seems to have produced no comparable 454 
interferences (Fujinawa and Noda 2013). 455 
 456 
The tsunami hazard mitigation system in NE Japan was (and is) unusual in the variety and scale of mitigation strategies 457 
used. In addition to the responsive mitigation strategies of evacuations following local and international warning system 458 
alerts, a variety of permanent mitigation strategies were also implemented in the region. These are summarized in Table 459 
2 where two general trends can be observed at least for the locations in which key studies (notably, Ando et al. 2013) 460 
were carried out.  461 
 462 
First, since the tsunami was very much larger in scale and intensity than expected in almost all of the engineered (or 463 
“hard”; Shibayama et al., 2013) permanent mitigation strategies, these strategies generally showed brittle behavior. In 464 
some cases this was physical brittleness (e.g. tsunami barrier walls that collapsed under loads in excess of design limits 465 
or due to design faults), and in others brittleness in the sense of a drastic decrease in effectiveness beyond the design 466 
hazard intensity (e.g. the overtopping of tsunami barriers and complete inundation of tsunami shelters). Large numbers 467 
of deaths amongst people in inundated tsunami vertical evacuation shelters highlights the point that the brittle behavior 468 
of the permanent mitigation strategy manifested in these structures also reduced the overall effectiveness of the 469 
mitigation system not only by the direct physical consequences of their failures but also by their interferences with the 470 
operation of the responsive mitigation strategies. Thus, the effectiveness of the evacuation strategies (whether based on 471 
the permanently in place technologies of national or local warning systems, or even on self-warning as discussed below) 472 
was destroyed if, on the basis of these warnings, people evacuated to vertical evacuation shelters that were subsequently 473 
inundated, becoming traps rather than shelters (Earthquake Engineering Research Institute 2011; Ando et al. 2013). 474 
Other interferences between elements of the physical structures that were manifestations of the permanent mitigation 475 
strategies, and actions prescribed by the responsive mitigation strategies, are also indicated in Table 2. 476 
 477 
In contrast to the brittle behavior of permanent mitigation strategies designed on the basis of the national seismic and 478 
tsunami hazard assessment, permanent strategies designed on local knowledge of past tsunami events were highly 479 
effective (Mori et al., 2011). Examples include the relocation inland of villages after previous tsunamis in 1896 and 480 
1933 and prohibitions on building downslope and seaward of traditional tsunami inundation markers (Shibata 2012; 481 
Suppasri et al. 2012, 2013), as well as the design of the Onagawa NPP (Sasagawa and Hirata 2012) where the simple 482 
decision to build as much as possible of the installation above the inundation limit of the 1896 tsunami was a highly 483 
successful permanent mitigation strategy, fundamental to the survival and safe shut-down of this NPP. This highlights 484 
the critical sensitivity of permanent (or “hard”; Shibayama et al., 2013) mitigation strategies to errors in assessments of 485 
long-term hazard occurrence and intensity distributions. 486 
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Table 2. Mitigation strategies used in the Tohoku 2011 earthquake and tsunami, their classification and effectiveness. 487 
 488 
Mitigation strategy Category (and 
subsidiary elements) 
Comments on effectiveness in March 11th 2011 tsunami disaster References  
Engineered tsunami barriers (and gates) Permanent (but with 
gates closed in response 
to tsunami warnings) 
Barriers designed to protect towns and ports against moderate-sized tsunamis 
collapsed or were overtopped by the actual tsunami waves that were larger than 
allowed for in the design. 
Earthquake Engineering 
Research Institute (2011); 
Suppasri et al. (2013) 
Coastal tree plantations (“soft” or 
permeable tsunami barriers designed to 
slow inundations. 
Permanent Trees in plantations were broken or uprooted by the tsunami waves, increasing 
debris damage in the areas behind the plantations that were inundated by tsunami 
floodwaters choked with tree debris. 
Suppasri et al. (2013) 
Restriction of development in 
anticipated inundation zone, based upon 
experience of historic large tsunamis 
(869 AD, 1896 AD, 1933 AD in 
particular) preserved in local knowledge 
and expressed in carved marker stones 
along the limits of previous inundations. 
Permanent Based upon prior local experience rather than the national tsunami hazard 
assessment and highly effective in protecting villages on the Sanriku coast that 
had relocated inland or to high ground beyond the inundation limits of the 1896 
AD tsunami in particular, as inundations from that event were broadly 
comparable to those in 2011. The Onagawa NPP site was also laid out on the 
principle of minimizing, as much as possible, the elements of the installation 
located below the inundation limit of the 1896 AD tsunami at Onagawa: this was 
effective in ensuring the safe shutdown of the installation. 
Suppasri et al. (2013); 
Sasagawa & Hirata (2012) 
Evacuations in response to messages 
originating from Japan Meteorological 
Agency rapid-response instrumental 
tsunami warning system. 
Responsive (with 
Permanent monitoring 
and communications 
infrastructure forming 
technological sub-
systems) 
Initial warning based on incomplete data underestimated tsunami size, indicating 
that it would not be large enough to overtop tsunami defences. JMA earthquake 
magnitude estimates (and tsunami predictions) not upgraded until 2 to 12 hours 
later. In some areas, few people received the JMA warning messages due to 
breakdown of communications infrastructure as a result of the earthquake and 
power outages. 
Ando et al. (2013) 
Evacuations in response to local 
warnings, or self-warning in response to 
felt seismic shaking and/or observation 
of approaching tsunami waves. 
Responsive (with 
Permanent warning 
infrastructure forming 
technological sub-
systems) 
Effective in many places on the Sanriku coast in particular, reflecting prior 
community experience of tsunamis, except in cases where people believed they 
were safe behind tsunami defences, or evacuated to tsunami shelters that were 
subsequently inundated. Some people did not evacuate as the tsunami waves 
neared the shore because tsunami barriers blocked their view of the sea; others 
did not evacuate because they were above the level of tsunami shelter roofs, and 
so believed that they were safe; or evacuated only to the edges of tsunami hazard 
zones as defined in official maps and were caught by tsunami waves larger than 
those allowed for in the maps. In some cases the local warning systems depended 
on emergency workers remaining at their posts within the inundation zone, and so 
effective operation of these systems was at the cost of the lives of the emergency 
workers concerned. 
Earthquake Engineering 
Research Institute (2011); 
Ando et al. (2013) 
Provision or earmarking of tall buildings 
as tsunami vertical evacuation shelters 
within expected inundation zones to 
reduce evacuation time to reach safety. 
Permanent Many of these shelters were designed to protect against the moderate tsunamis 
predicted by the hazard assessment, but were largely or completely inundated by 
the actual tsunami, resulting in high mortality rates amongst people trapped in the 
shelters. 
Earthquake Engineering 
Research Institute (2011); 
Suppasri et al. (2013) 
 489 
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A second trend, although not as clear, is that some responsive mitigation strategies may have interfered with others. 490 
From table 2 (see especially the study by Ando et al. (2013), albeit a very small survey) it is evident that a variety of 491 
interferences between responsive mitigation strategies occurred during the Tohoku disaster. Initial underestimation 492 
errors in the official bulletins (the basis for the responsive mitigation strategy of instrumental warning system based 493 
evacuation) caused this strategy to interfere with the more basic responsive mitigation strategy of evacuation based on 494 
individual or community knowledge, observation and warning. Continued operation of the instrumental warning system 495 
was disrupted by the power failures resulting perhaps in part from interference from the earthquake hazard mitigation 496 
strategy of automated shutdown of nuclear power plants. However, given that the JMA underestimated the predicted 497 
size of the tsunami up until it actually struck the Sanriku coast (Ando et al., 2013), it may be that the collapse of the 498 
broadcast communication system ultimately reduced rather than increased casualties, by removing a source of 499 
erroneous information that conflicted with other information that correctly indicated that a major tsunami was about to 500 
strike, such as the strength and duration of seismic shaking and the direct observation of approaching tsunami waves. 501 
 502 
We emphasise that much further work needs to be done on collecting and analyzing data relating to the actions, and the 503 
reasons for those actions, of people who were in the inundation zone of the Tohoku tsunami. Nevertheless, present 504 
indications are that destructive interactions or interferences occurred both between different responsive mitigation 505 
strategies, and especially between permanent mitigation strategies and responsive mitigation strategies, that greatly 506 
reduced their effectiveness as parts of the overall mitigation system with the result that some of the responsive 507 
mitigation strategies were as brittle as the permanent mitigation strategies. Rather than operating together to enhance 508 
the effectiveness of the tsunami mitigation system as a whole, the application of science, technological ingenuity, and 509 
considerable investment of economic resources to a wide range of mitigation strategies appears to have produced an 510 
embrittled mitigation system that experienced serious malfunctions under hazard intensities greater than the maximum 511 
which its component strategies – especially most permanent mitigation strategies – had been designed to resist. 512 
 513 
4: Summary and Reflections 514 
 515 
4.1 Summary 516 
 517 
This paper has advocated the analysis of mitigation systems in terms of the mitigation strategies that they contain and 518 
the interactions between those strategies, in an approach similar to that of a systems analysis more generally. As a key 519 
step in this process it has presented a classification of mitigation strategies into permanent, responsive, and anticipatory 520 
strategies. The classification is based on the two criteria of first, when the strategy operates (permanently, at the time of 521 
the hazard event, or in the anticipation of the event in response to precursors), and second, on whether or not the 522 
strategy can be modified or adapted, in response to near real-time observations of the hazards or its precursors. 523 
Permanent mitigation strategies do not require such observations or the warning systems needed to make and 524 
communicate them, and it is for this reason that the paper has adopted the mitigation system terminology in place the 525 
concept of the early warning system.  526 
 527 
The boundaries between these classes of mitigation strategy are gradational, and the position of any given mitigation 528 
strategy within the gradation, depends on the extent to which any actions involved are predetermined or optional and 529 
based upon observations of the hazard event. As a result the viability and effectiveness of particular types of mitigation 530 
strategy in dealing with particular hazards is strongly dependant upon the capacity to observe the hazard and interpret 531 
those observations in time to adequately implement the mitigation strategy. The current state of knowledge of the 532 
hazard may be sufficient to support some classes of mitigation strategy but not others.  533 
 534 
An additional property of mitigation strategies identified as important is that brittle mitigation strategies may be more 535 
effective below their limiting hazard intensity than more flexible strategies, but are far less effective above this limit. It 536 
follows that adoption of a brittle mitigation strategy is more likely to have dangerous consequences when it is not based 537 
upon a good understanding of those features of the hazard that affect its performance.  538 
 539 
4.2 Reflections upon the Tohoku 2011 case study 540 
 541 
The Tohoku 2011 example shows that interactions between mitigation strategies have profound effects upon the overall 542 
performance of the mitigation system. Since these interactions have not been previously been systematically recognised 543 
and allowed for in the design of mitigation systems, they have usually been destructive and have greatly reduced the 544 
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effectiveness of complex mitigation systems such as the tsunami mitigation system in NE Japan. In particular, 545 
permanent mitigation strategies like those emphasised in Japan prior to 2011, are often inherently brittle, since once 546 
implemented they lack the capacity to adapt to new hazard observations. It is arguable that they should only be used 547 
when there is no knowledge base that enables responsive or anticipatory mitigation strategies (such as the mitigation of 548 
earthquake hazards where the main strategy is that of building to high standards of seismic resistance). A key problem 549 
that should be addressed whenever a permanent mitigation strategy is included within a mitigation system is how to 550 
ensure that people execute effective responsive or anticipatory mitigation despite their expectations of the performance 551 
of permanent mitigation strategies. It is critical to ensure that vulnerable populations have realistic expectations of the 552 
performance of permanent mitigation strategies and in particular understand that they lose their effectiveness above 553 
their design hazard intensity limit: this point is now emphasised in awareness education in Japan by the division of 554 
tsunami hazards into high- and low- intensity cases (Shibayama et al., 2013). We consider that, in order to further 555 
reduce destructive interactions between permanent and decision-action dependent (responsive and anticipatory) 556 
mitigation strategies, there is a need to understand the decision-making processes, in emergencies, of vulnerable 557 
populations and individuals. In particular there is a need to understand how observations and warning messages are 558 
interpreted by populations and individuals in the light of their prior knowledge and expectations to form the basis of 559 
decision-making and thus mitigative actions on the part of vulnerable populations.   560 
 561 
Our choice of the NE Japan tsunami mitigation system and its performance in the 2011 disaster, as an example with 562 
which to illustrate the application of our concepts, raises the question of whether they can be applied to other mitigation 563 
systems. Certainly, some mitigation systems are so simple - for example the tradition-based self-warning and voluntary 564 
evacuation tsunami mitigation practiced in the southwest Pacific (McAdoo et al., 2009) - that their operation is largely 565 
or entirely dependent on a single mitigation strategy and so the problems of interaction between strategies may not 566 
arise. However, most mitigation systems, especially those that operate to protect developed societies against major 567 
hazards, are likely to involve multiple mitigation strategies. Detailed examination of a sufficient number of such 568 
systems to demonstrate the universal application of our approach is beyond the scope of the present paper, but we note 569 
as an example that the hurricane mitigation system that operated on the US Gulf Coast in 2005 included a range of 570 
mitigation strategies including permanent (most notably, the New Orleans flood defence levees), anticipatory (regional-571 
scale evacuation)  and responsive (local evacuation to high buildings and shelters) mitigation strategies that in both 572 
variety and complexity may be comparable to those that operated in NE Japan in 2011. Although the details of the 573 
technological, socio-economic and political environment in which the US hurricane mitigation system operated in 2005 574 
are clearly different from, and arguably more complex than, the situation in Japan in 2011, we suggest that one way to 575 
resolve the many controversies that surround the Hurricane Katrina disaster may be analyse the mitigation system that 576 
operated during that event using the conceptual tools and methods that we have outlined in this paper. We emphasise 577 
again that the primary aim of this paper is to outline a conceptual framework that may assist others to understand, 578 
investigate and analyse existing mitigation systems and ultimately help to devise and evaluate more effective mitigation 579 
systems in the future. 580 
 581 
4.3. Implications of the classification and interactions framework for the Disaster Management cycle. 582 
 583 
In practice, the DM cycle is in often linearized (Coetzee & van Niekerk, 2012) so that the stages are seen as entirely 584 
sequential with the overall effectiveness of actions within one circuit of the cycle being the linear sum of the actions 585 
taken in the parts, rather than a complex product of these parts and the interactions between them (Garcia & Fearnley, 586 
2012). In this paper we have emphasised that although choices of mitigation strategies and of the policies designed to 587 
implement them are decided upon far in advance of hazard events, the actions involved in the actual operation of them 588 
may occur long before (permanent mitigation) in the mitigation phase of the DM cycle, shortly before (anticipatory 589 
mitigation) in the preparedness phase, or during (responsive mitigation) hazard events, in the responsive phase. 590 
Therefore we have identified that not only do interferences occur between different mitigation strategies across the four 591 
phases, but that interferences also occur between mitigation strategies and strategies developed and implemented in 592 
other phases of the DM cycle. Thus, although the DM cycle remains a useful conceptual tool, it has important 593 
limitations as a framework within which to evaluate the successes and failures of disaster management measures. Our 594 
classification, as exemplified by the case study of Tohoku, highlights the need to recognise the changing social, 595 
political, technological and other contexts in which mitigation strategies operate, and the interactions they have with 596 
other strategies for preparedness, response and recovery. These interactions can be defined as a complex system; ‘a 597 
system in which large networks of components with no central control and simple rules of operation [that] give rise to 598 
complex collective behaviour, sophisticated information processing and adaptation via learning or evolution’ (Mitchell, 599 
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2009, p.13), and exhibit nontrivial emergent behaviours. Rather than critique the value of the DM cycle, we intend this 600 
research to support the applicability of non-linear and holistic approaches to disaster management (Miletti 1999; 601 
Ramalingam et al., 2008) that enable decision makers, at all levels, to understand the limitations involved and determine 602 
the risks in establishing effective mitigation strategies, rather than simply following normative or procedural protocols.  603 
 604 
4.4 Potential application of the classification and interactions framework in the practice of mitigation system 605 
design and operation 606 
 607 
The classification and interaction framework presented in this paper may have practical application to the work of 608 
different actors involved in hazard mitigation.   609 
 610 
Emergency managers could use this framework in a process of prospective analysis of mitigation systems not yet tested 611 
by occurrence of the hazards that they are designed to mitigate. The aim of this would be to identify weaknesses in the 612 
mitigation systems in which they are responsible due to destructive interactions between mitigation strategies. 613 
Furthermore they could design corrective actions that ensure non-interference between mitigation strategies or, even 614 
better, positive interaction between mitigation strategies. 615 
 616 
In the light of the concepts presented here, hazard scientists need to examine, recognise, and correct limitations of 617 
knowledge that are critical to both the operation of individual strategies as well as for negative interactions between 618 
mitigation strategies such as those resulting from unexpected brittle failure of permanent mitigation strategies.   619 
 620 
Finally, the analysis presented here indicates that policy makers should not choose and implement individual 621 
mitigations strategies in isolation, but should evaluate them within the framework of the overall mitigation systems.  622 
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